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1. INTRODUCTION 
Vickrey [l] formulated a Nash equilibrium model of bidding by risk neutral economic agents in 
single unit auctions. Cox, Roberson and Smith [2] and Cox, Smith and Walker [3] studied a first 
price single unit auction between agents with constant relative risk aversion. When individual 
values for the auctioned object are assumed to be drawn from a uniform distribution, the equilib- 
rium bid function can be expressed explicitly, and the expression shows that the equilibrium bid 
independent of the distribution of the random parameter r in bidders’ utility function u(y) = yr. 
Thus, every bidder i can submit a bid the same as he submits in the case in which all his rivals 
have the same parameter r; with himself. However, Long [4] gave an example to show that it 
is not the case for the multiunit auctions. In the present paper, we show that the equilibrium 
bids in multiunit auctions depend only on the expected value of r, when individual values are 
distributed uniformly. So this paper solves the equilibrium bid function for the multiunit in two 
steps. In the first step, we obtain the equilibrium bid function in the case in which all bidders 
are identical constant relative risk averse, and thus, in the case of random parameter with known 
expected value of r, we can obtain the equilibrium bid function for the parameter which is equal 
to the expected value. In the second step, we obtain that inverses of equilibrium bid functions 
are linear on r, and then, from the equilibrium bid function with random parameter which is 
equal to the expected value of r, we can compute the equilibrium bid with random parameter 
r. Harris and Raviv [5] consider a multiple unit auction in the case in which all agents have 
identical linear (risk neutral) and concave (risk averse) utility function, and obtain expression of 
risk neutral equilibrium bid function. Our result in this paper is the generalization. 
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2. MODEL 
Let Q 2 1 unit(s) of a homogeneous good be offered in perfectly inelastic supply to N > Q 
bidders. Each bidder submits a bid for single unit with the understanding that each of the Q 
highest bidders will be awarded a unit of the good at a price equal to his bid; i.e., the institution 
is a discriminative sealed-bid auction. Let vi be the monetary value of a unit of the good to 
bidder i, where i = 1,2,. , N. Bidders are assumed to know their own vi, but to know only the 
probability distribution with cdf H(.) on (0, ~1, from which their rivals’ values are independently 
drawn. H(.) is assumed to have a continuous density function h(.) that is positive on (0, 8). 
Suppose that all bidders are constant relative risk averse, i.e., each bidder i has a utility function 
as form ui(y) = yTX, where ri is a random variable with probability distribution @o(.) on (O,F), 
where f > 1. Each bidder is assumed to know his or her own ri but to know only that rj of his 
or her rivals’ j is drawn from the probability distribution a(.). Here, Cp may not have density 
function; it can have a mass of probability of 1. Therefore, included as special cases are the 
models where all bidders are risk-neutral or all bidders are identical constant relative risk-averse. 
In this paper, we consider the symmetric equilibrium in differentiable strategies. Suppose that 
each bidder i expects each of his or her rivals to bid according to the differentiable bid function 
bi = b(vi,ri), (1) 
let b(w, r) be strictly increasing in v and have the property that b(0, r) = 0 for all r E [0, i;], and 
denote by n(b, r) the v-inverse of bid function b(w, r). The probability that bidder i will bid less 
than or equal to some amount b in the range of (1) is 
F(b) = 
/ 
H(G, r)) d@(r). (2) 
Iwq 
Hence, the probability that a bid 6 by i will win is the probability 
G(b)= (;:;)I” F(s)~+~[I - F(z)]~-~ dF(z) . 
From the result of [4] for a more general model, a differentiable function b(w, r) is an equilibrium 
bid function if and only if its v-inverse r(b, r) satisfies 
r(b,r) - b G(b) 
r =Eg-y 
3. EQUILIBRIUM BIDS OF IDENTICAL 
RISK PREFERENCE MODELS 
(4) 
In this section, we consider the model, in which all bidders are identical constant relative risk 
averse. That is, all bidders have the same utility function u(y) = yr, where r is the common 
constant relative risk parameter. Denote by b,.(w) the equilibrium bid function, n,(b) the inverse 
of b,(w). Hence, from (2), we have 
F(b) = H(n-@I). (5) 
Let 
G&)=(“dI;)~= H(w)N-Q-i[l - H(w)]*-W(w). (6) 
In fact, GH(.) is the probability distribution of (N - Q)th-order statistic for a sample of size 
N - 1 from the distribution H(.). Equation (3) can be rewritten as follows: 
G(b) =Gddb)) = 
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Thus, equation (4) can be rewritten to be 
T-(b) - b GH(G@)) 
r = G’H(T~@)) +,(b) 
and the equilibrium bid function b,.(v) satisfies 
v - b-(v) GH (~1 
T 
= - . b’y(w). 
G’H (V) 
Solving equation (9), we obtain 
b,(w) = 1 
s 
2) 
G?(w) o 
mdG$‘(z). 
As a special case, when r = 1, 
1 v 
h(v) = GH(v) o odG&c) 
s 
is the risk neutral equilibrium bid function which has been obtained by [5]. 
If h(.) is the constant density (@i)-‘, then, b,(v) follows (10) and 
Furthermore, if Q = 1, we have a very simple expression [2] 
b,(w)= n-1 21. 
n-l+?- 
(8) 
(9) 
(10) 
(11) 
(13) 
4. EQUILIBRIUM BIDS OF NOT 
IDENTICAL RISK PREFERENCE 
In this section, we concentrate on solving equation (4) in the case that individual values for 
the auctioned object(s) were assumed to be drawn from a uniform distribution, and bidders may 
be different constant relative risk averse as mentioned in Section 2. 
As h(.) is the constant density (@)-l, from equation (2), for the v-inverse n(b,r) of any bid 
function b(v, T-), 
(14) 
By equation (4), if r(b, ) T is an equilibrium bid function, then 
4hr) = T, 
,JT (h ~7 - b . 1^ + b , for any r, T’ E (0,F) . (15) 
Particularly, take r’ = E,., where E, is the expected value of r, and equation (15) concludes that 
r(b,r) = 44 Er) - b E .T-+ b. 
P 
Thus, by equation (14), we have 
WI 
F(b) = ; n(b, ET) = H(vr(b, E,.)). (17) 
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To solve equation (4), by equation, it sufficient to obtain ~(b,Er). From equation (4), a@,&) 
satisfies 
where 
G(b)= (“d:;)l” F(z)N-Q-y1 - Iqzc)]Q-l dF(z). (19) 
By equation (17), 
G(b) = GH(+ ~3.)) = H(v)N-Q-l[l - H(v)]Q-1 m(w) ) (20) 
where H(.) is the distribution function of the uniform distribution on (0, S) with constant density 
h(.) = (Q-1. 
Hence, it is completely similar to solve equations (7)-(g), and obtain the solution bp(v) which 
satisfies equation (10). We can solve equations (18),(20) to obtain that 
where 
(21) 
(22) 
So, the solution r(b, ET) of equation (18) is the v-inverse of b(v, ET) defined by equation (21). 
This is an interesting result: one bidder, whose risk parameter is equal to the expected value 
of risk parameter, just acts the same as he or she does in the case of identical risk parameter. 
Finally, the solution of equation (4) is given by equations (21) and (16). 
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